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ABSTRACT 
The issuance of the amended Malaysian Code on Corpor~te Governance (MCCG) in 2007 
clearly shows that continuous efforts have been done by the regulators and policy makers to 
I 
enhance good governance practices in Malaysia. Based on the MCCG, this study investigated the 
extent of the corporate governance practices and examined the relationship between corporate 
governance practices and the performance among Malaysiah listed companies. In addition, 
agency theory is used to explain the corporate governance praf tic es and firms' behavior which is 
based on the agent's action, and the objective of maximizing tme shareholders' wealth. This study 
covers five corporate governance variables which are expeclted to have relationship with the 
financial performance of the company. The five corporate gdvernance variables are number of 
directors, number of independent directors, firm size, leverage and cash flow. Using a sample of 
top 100 listed companies in Malaysia for the financial year 2loo9 until 2012, the findings show 
that firm performance is significantly related to firm size, levf rage and cash flow. However, the 
other two variables which are number of directors and number of independent directors are not 
significant towards the company performance. i 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, financial performance, Ma~aysia 
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Abstrak 
Langkah meminda Kod Urns Tadbir Korporat (MCCG) pada tahun 2007 jelas menunjukkan usaha 
yang berternsan yang dijalankan oleh pengawal selia serta p9nggubal polisi bagi meningkatkan 
amalan urns tadbir korporat yang baik di Malaysia. Berda~arkan MCCG tersebut, kajian ini 
menyelidik tahap amalan urns tadbir korporat serta perkaitan d~ antara amalan urns tadbir korporat 
dan prestasi dikalangan syarikat senaraian awam di Malaysia. Di samping itu, teori agensi 
digunakan untuk menerangkan amalan tadbir urns korpor~t dan tingkah laku firma yang 
berdasarkan tindakan ejen, dan tujuan memaksimumkan keka~aan para pemegang saham. Kajian 
ini meliputi lima pembolehubah tadbir urus korporat yang dijal gka mempunyai hubungan dengan 
prestasi kewangan syarikat. Pembolehubah yang digunakan atlalah bilangan pengarah, bilangan 
pengarah be bas, saiz firma, leveraj dan aliran tunai. Kajian ini 1menggunakan sampel 100 syarikat 
tersenarai teratas di Malaysia untuk tahun kewangan 2009 hingga 2012. Analisis empirikal 
menunjukkan hubungan yang signifikan ke atas pembolehubah saiz firma, leveraj dan aliran tunai. 
Walau bagaimanapun, dua pembolehubah lain ialah bilanganl pengarah and bilangan penagarah 
bebas tidak signifikan terhadap prestasi syarikat. 
Kata kunci: Tadbir urns korporat, prestasi kewangan, Malaysia 
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1.0 Background of the Study 
CHAPTERl 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate Governance (CG) plays an important role in the monitoring system of a company. In 
general, corporate governance covers all necessity of a company' s stakeholders and corporate 
social responsibility. There are many types of stakeholders involved the shareholders, 
management and the board of directors, employees, suppVers, customers, banks and other 
lenders, regulators, the environment and the public at large. The existence of corporate 
governance in the company is like the 'backbone' for them '1,S it will influence the direction of 
the management of the company. According to Ponnu (2008), corporate governance is important 
to the company because it supports to control and monitor boards performance in the 
management throughout the operations. 
Malaysia has been one of the fast developing economies in the world as it opened its market with 
lowered tariffs and alleviated foreign investments requirement. It is important for Malaysia firms 
to reform their financial performance as the emerging competition in the in both local and 
foreign market. This will indirectly allow firms to overcome the limitations of their local market 
in order to reach their targets in the potential markets. 
A business environment surrounded by forces of the legal, regulatory, financial and institutional 
system of a country has an impact on the firm 's entire performance. World globalization 
increases market prospective, trade and investments as well as the availability of the firm 
1 
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resources. However, globalization increases market oppo~ities of the firms as well as the 
competition faced by the organization. Globalization has made the market become worldwide 
and many multinational firms (MNC) emerged. 
Developing countries including Malaysia have reviewed the codes of corporate governance to 
practice a proper governance practice. This is where the Malaysian code of corporate governance 
(MCCG) which was presented in the year 2007 as a reply to varying stakeholder prospects and 
also an approach to boost the corporate governance system of the public listed organizations. 
Firm' s concentrates on maximizing shareholder's wealth which is also the stock value and this 
can be accomplished with the responsibility of top management from the directors till the 
managers. According to Jermanis (2006), the excellence of firm 's management can be shown 
through their capability to react upon the changes of the business environment. Whereas, Wang 
and Campbell (2012) suggest that the external factors and internal factors are the key factors to 
show the achievement of the firm's performance. 
The external factors arise from outside of the firm which beyond the control of managers such as 
the opportunities and threat. These factors consist of competitors, changing in customer 
preferences, customer behavior, instabilities of product prices, changes in government policy and 
recurring of market forces. However, the internal factors arise from the firm and summarize the 
ability of management to plan strategies as well as implement those strategies which appropriate 
to the business environment. 
2 
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Moreover, the roles of large shareholders who effectively control the corporation may lead to 
expropriation of minority shareholders. A study by Baq.chuenvijit (2012) indicated that 
shareholders that control firms are in position to extract the Nivate benefits of control compared 
to disperse shareholders who are not entitles for private benefits. The private benefits are 
influenced by who was elected by the board of directors and also have the power to build 
empires as well enjoyed the privileges at the expense of the firm. 
The corporate governance also foresees that these efforts would increase country's financial 
performance and also encourage the invasion of foreign direct investment. The corporate 
governance has managed to attract good public interest because of the deceptive standing for the 
economic and social in general. This will bring us to an understanding that if an organization 
wants to indorse voluntary disclosure of their corporate governance practice, organizations 
should be also aware of the benefits they possibly reach in terms of higher corporate 
performance Richard Price (2010). 
Finance Committee defines the corporate governance in Malaysia Corporate Governance (2002) 
as corporate governance is a process and structure which is used to direct and manage the 
business affairs of the organization, which will enhance business prosperity and corporate 
accountability with the main objective of recognizing long term shareholders value while taking 
account the interest of other stakeholders. 
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1.1 Problem Statement 
This research focuses on the relationship between corporate governance and corporate financial 
performance. After the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, it is important for organizations to prepare 
themselves to deal with such financial crisis as lack of CG awareness which may weaken the 
corporate institutions in Asian economies. 
The 1997-1998 Asian financial crises which affected Malaysia and several other Asian countries 
are considered as an alert call for a better corporate governance and transparency among 
Malaysian companies (Hassan M.C.H. et al., 2008). This is because it is important for Malaysian 
firms to reform their financial performance as the world busiqess is emerging into a competitive 
market. 
The study has prompted the importance of corporate governance which indicates how the 
"regulation" of good corporate governance positively affects \he assurance and protection of the 
financial impacts the companies and also the country. 
The high recession from the financial crisis begins in June 1997 till August 1998 affected all the 
industries and pushed to high inflation rate towards the ~mvironment. Therefore, the poor 
management of corporate governance is borne by the shareholders where many public listed 
companies in Malaysia are family owned. Examples of companies that we can relate due to the 
crisis would be Renong, Perwaja Steel and Malaysian Airlines System (MAS). This can be seen 
in the previous studies by Kim (1998), D' Cruz (1999) and Khas (2002) which similarly explain 
4 
on ownership of shareholders is affected by the lack of COfJPOrate governance and turns up to 
economic crisis for the East Asian regions. 
Compared to countries in the US, Malaysian's company's voluntary disclosure is way different 
where companies in UK gives high importance to disclosures but in Malaysia timely information 
is not provided and they keep silent on certain occasion which the stakeholders need to know. 
One of the ways to increase stakeholder confidence is mainly to have proper governance 
practices that can contribute to a better financial revelations and more transparent based business 
reporting Graham et al (2002). 
According to Mohamad (2002), the lack of managing corporate governance, stakeholder's 
relationship and level of transparency in disclosing information by listed companies in Bursa 
Malaysia and the no interest of regulatory agencies in imposing regulation in punishing the 
offenders and protecting the minority shareholders, are all equally blamed as reasons attributing 
to the downfall of certain Malaysian companies. 
Previous studies conducted on the relationship between coworate governance and corporate 
financial focused mainly on companies in the developed countries such as the US study by 
Gordon and Hayes (2002) based on United States studies, Park (2002) and Shin (2002) based on 
Canadian studies, West (2006) based on a South Africa studies and Guess (2008) based on a 
United Kingdom studies. Generally, the objectives of the studies are to analyze the effect of 
corporate governance practices and the improvements which impact the emerging market. 
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In Malaysia, several studies have been conducted on the corporate governance and corporate 
financial performance such as Haniffa (2002) and Cooke (2002). However, these studies focused 
more on ownership structure, board size, CEO duality and fFequency of meeting. Looking into 
the ownership structure they have argued on the top holder of majority stock of the firm is 
pyramiding can almost have wide-ranging control of the whole property as a sole owner 
nevertheless his ownership interest less than one percent of the whole. Ownership structure 
concerns more on the shareholders which also known as one of key factors of corporate 
governance based on their power and incentive segregation among the shareholders (Mitton, 
2002). 
Next on the board size, studies show that size also increase or decrease base on the merger and 
acquisition of stocks depending on the stockholders. The board size focus on the importance for 
shareholder monitoring and the control which also represeQts the board composition of each 
organization. Thus, the board size is concerned on the number of executive directors against the 
number of directors in an organization (Berle and Means, 1932) 
I 
The CEO duality has been portrayed as the CEO who is a1so the chair person will have the 
rigorous power that might allow the CEO to make decisioq.s of their own self-interest. CEO 
duality concerns on the ability of a chairman who plays the role as a single person for the 
position CEO and chairman concurrently and basically this may increase the efficiency in 
monitoring the management (Haniffa and Coke, 2000). 
6 
Lastly the frequency of meeting has been discussed as the number of meetings held may 
influence the firm's decision-making regulation and also affeot the willingness of the directors to 
serve the board and the organization. The frequency of meeting is thoroughly depending on the 
number of meeting an organization have which can be concl, ded that poor management can be 
resolved by increasing the board activity more (Vafeas, 1999). 
Overall, this paper analyses the corporate performance of Malaysian firms and provides evidence 
showing that majority of Malaysian firms have a good corporate governance practices. This 
I 
analysis is more on finding the relationship between practices of corporate governance over the 
firm's performance by giving empirical evidence on the inHµence of the corporate governance 
practices over the firm's corporate performance for all the listfd Malaysian firms by sectors over 
the period of 2009 until 2012. 
This research mainly examines the association of the board composition between the financial 
performances. Looking into board compositions although therr are many aspects to be examined 
such as directors ' ownership, CEO duality and board size, this study will focus more on the 
number of board of directors and number of independent dir~ctors in an organization and how 
does this this impact the financial performances. It is well knqwn that the number of directors in 
a board is important in any decision making which has ~he full rights and obligations to 
strengthen the growth of the organizations and also to make better returns as in profit. 
7 
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1.2 Research questions 
The purpose of this study is to identify the relationship bbtween corporate governance and 
corporate financial performance. 
1. What is the relationship between the corporate finapcial performance and number of 
directors? 
2. What is the relationship between the corporate financial performance and number of 
independent board of directors (BOD)? 
3. What is the relationship between corporate financial performance and firm size? 
4. What is the relationship between corporate financial performance and leverage? 
5. What is the relationship between corporate financial performance and cash flow? 
1.3 Research objectives 
The mam purpose of the study is to examme the relationship between corporate financial 
performance and corporate governance. The aim is to find whether the number of directors, 
number of independent directors, firm size, leverage and cash flow have positive, negative or no 
relationship with the firm performance. The objectives are: 
1. To examine the relationship between number of director~ and corporate financial 
performance. 
2. To investigate the relationship between independent of board of directors (BOD) and 
corporate financial performance. 
3. To examine the relationship between firm size and corporate financial performance. 
I 
4. To identify the relationship between leverage and corporate financial performance. 
5. To examine the relationship between cash flow and corporate financial performance. 
. I 
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1.4 Significance of the study 
This research can provide the organization an understanding of corporate governance 
mechanisms and practices that could affect the organizatjional financial performance. The 
findings can provide the organization an understanding on the importance of good corporate 
governance practices particularly in terms of how it can affect corporate financial performance. 
In addition, this study can also contribute to the frame of la;iowledge by filling the gap in the 
literature of the relationship between the corporate governance and company financial 
performance on public listed companies in Malaysia. From the theoretical perspective, this study 
will support the agency theory in the terms of the relationship between the principal and the 
I 
agent. The results of this study will contribute to the literature by addressing some of important 
limitation of the previous studies. The results will also provide more understandings on the 
relationship between some corporate governance mechanisms and firm's performance in 
Malaysia. 
From the practical perspective, the findings of this study will be advisable for organizations, 
shareholders, investors and the regulators in Malaysia by giving information on the efficiency of 
some corporate governance instruments that influence the firm's performance after the revise of 
Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance 2012 (MCCG 2012!, this is can ensure they make the 
proper improvements in the corporate governance practices in their organizations and to protect 
the interest of the shareholders. 
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1.5 Scope of the study 
This study focuses on nine sectors of financial and non-financial listed firms such as finance, 
trading and services, plantation, industrial products, c1nsumer products, infrastructure, 
construction, property and technology on the main market of the Bursa Malaysia for the year 
2009 to 2012. This study includes five independent variab~es, namely, number of directors, 
number of independent directors, board size, leverage and cash flow and the dependent variableis 
firm performance. 
1.6 Organization of Thesis 
Chapter 1 is an introductory chapter of this study where it reports the background of the study, 
problem statement, research questions and objectives, significance of the study, and also the 
scope and limitation of the study. Chapter 2 reviews the previous literature and related studies 
about cash holdings as the main focus of the study. Chapter 3 develops the research framework, 
hypotheses and research design, and discusses the selected variables, data collection, sampling 
method, and appropriate analysis technique to achieve the research objectives. Chapter 4 presents 
the results and analysis of the findings, and Chapter 5 concludes the study by presenting the 





This chapter discusses the relevant literature review and past studies which are related to 
relationship between corporate financial performance and qorporate governance. One of the 
underpinning theories that explain this relationship is the agency theory, which is discussed in 
I 
Section 2.1. This is followed by the explanation of the corporate governance theory, Malaysian 
Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) and empirical studies on the relationship between 
agency cost and financial performance. 
2.1 Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) 
According to the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG), all the companies in this 
country are expected or have to comply with the corporate i overnance and make it as part of 
their corporate culture. The guidelines which are prov~ded in the code are only the 
recommendations and there are many incredulities that tqe recommendations can actually 
substitute the rule based approach, example the US Sarbanes Oxley Act (Abdul Hadi et al, 2000). 
This act gives importance on the entire company' s regulatio111s which should be adhered to by 
everyone in the company, from the top management to the fower level employees. The main 
I 
purpose of the Act is to ensure the reliability of the financial information produced by every 
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company and also to reduce misunderstandings of the functiom of both the board of directors and 
the independent board of directors. 
This is because the governance practices will help the org~zation to develop better ability to 
attract the potential and maintaining their existing stakeholders. Several studies have discussed 
the significance of the corporate governance which highlights the advantages and disadvantages 
of this rule based approaches which have given impact to the countries like the United States. It 
is clearly stated that the rule based approaches is to support the corporate governance with 
confidence, reliability and highest integrity. 
Nevertheless, the drawback of rule based approach is that its extreme dependence on rules and 
regulations directly broaden the expenditure of running a business. Other than that it also 
oversees the important elements of corporate governance. 
Indirectly, good corporate governance can increase the cm!mtry's financial growth and also 
promising inflow of foreign direct investment. The corporate governance has prospered in 
drawing a good attention of public interest because of its importance for the economic health of 
corporations and in tum, the society as a whole. 
In light of the above argument, one can assume that to prnmote the voluntary disclosure of 
corporate governance practice, organizations should be aware of the benefits they make 
especially in terms of higher corporate performance (Price et al., 2010). 
I 
12 
According to Price (2010), corporate governance practice~ allow organizations to compete 
positively and also follow the regulations which are standardized for all the business 
I 
organization. It is a form of monitoring process as well since if governs the corporate governance 
and also the performance. In Malaysia, an institute specifically catered to the development and 
regulations of corporate governance has been established f 1998, which is The Malaysian 
Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG). 
MICG is a prominent organization which enhances corporate governance development and best 
practices through performances for all the stakeholders in thf company, from the directors and 
investors to the employees. In essence, the role of MICF is to make sure the MCCG is adhered to 
by all companies in Malaysia. 
Although the Malaysian regulators have formed a comm1ndable outline for the corporate 
governance, the Malaysian corporations have not achieved the acceptable level of corporate 
governance practices and compliance. There have been evidences signifying that companies 
who chose to go for voluntary disclosure believed to have gained higher benefits compared to 
those who disclosed with usual requirement (Abdul Hadi et al. r' 2000). 
Abdul Hadi has explained that with the fair disclosure of information there are chances to invite 
investors from foreign which indirectly enhance their compaq.y performances. Highest achieved 
organizations are the ones which gives importance to disclosures. This is to make sure there is 
less inadequacy or low level of reliability. 
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2.2 Agency Theory 
Agency theory focuses how the management maintains its liaison and arrives to predetermined 
measures with the managers or agents. The circumstances where the subordinate agents work 
with the corporate manager's will affect the performance of the firm. Common matters as 
compensation, accounting practices or risk taking are the m~jor concerns of both the principal 
and the agent relationship Jensen and Warner (1998). 
When the board of directors is independent from management, and their responsibility is to be 
answerable and transparent to the shareholders or stakeholder~, they will reveal all the pertinent 
information, regardless of the mandatory or voluntary conqerns (Hassan et. al., 2008). This 
statement additionally shows that this theory is useful and was help to drive the managers to 
perform better. 
There are many ways to define the concept agency problem. A study by Ross et al. (1977) 
I 
defines "the agency relationship that arise between one party being the principal whom delegates 
certain duties to another party who are the agents to represent his or her interest which may cause 
the conflict of interest between the principal and the agent". 
The author assumes that both the agent and the principal share the same subjective beliefs about 
I 
the occurrence fee as a function of the payoff only. The agent (or the principal) might have 
different information about the current situations of the world than the principal (agent) which 
would be the reason of the agency problem. 
14 
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Thus, the author concludes the standard of remuneration structure indirectly resolves the 
principal's problem and lead to Pareto efficiency for both fgent and principal which mostly 
likely to happen in organization practices. 
Pareto (1949) defined Pareto efficiency is s state of provision pf resources where it is impossible 
to make any one person better off making the other worst off Armour et al. (2009) define that 
most of the agency problems arise from the conflict between insiders ( controlling owners and top 
managers) and outsiders (minority shareholders or creditors), instead of between ownership and 
management. 
There are three types of agency problems which rise in o~ganizations. The first problem is 
between owners (principals) and the managers (agents), this is where the problem arises to 
ensure the managers who acting on the owner' s interest. 
The second problem is between controlling owners and non-controlling owners (minority) in 
I 
which problem to ensure that the controlling owners are not taken by minority. This problem 
seems to be the most noticeable strains between controlling and minority shareholders if veto 
rights to make particular decision are held by minority shareholders. 
Furthermore, the similar problems might anse between 0th.er shareholders as well such as 
between ordinary and preference shareholders, or between senior and junior creditors in the case 
of bankruptcy. The third agency problem is the conflict between the firms itself (the owners) 
which acts as an agent here and the parties that the firm coµtracts with, such as its creditors, 
15 
employees and customers which act as principal here. The pnpblem is to ensure the firm (agent) 
does not expropriate those principals. 
2.3 Corporate Governance in relation to Agency Theory 
The collapse of Enron Xerox, World.com, Lehman Brothe~s and Washington Mutual which 
holding over US $100 billion assets has shocked the world as well the investors' confidence. 
Therefore, a corporate governance instrument has gained sig1tificant consideration in the recent 
years. 
As consequences, in order to develop corporate governance mechanism, the Sarbanes-Oxley act 
was enacted in 2012. The act gives a significant prospect for financial revolution with the hope 
that corporate governance mechanism may recover public con;fidence, accurateness and financial 
information reliability is assured. 
Cadbury (1992,) defined "corporate governance as a system which organizations are directed and 
organized". The governance structure specified the rights anq responsibilities among the firm ' s 
board of director, shareholders, other stakeholder and management. Mayer (1996), defined 
"corporate governance will ensure the ways to bring two partitts along together to make sure they 
both company each other to reach out the benefits of the sharefu.olders". 
Corporate governance is connected with agency theory, where the firm would run by the agent 
on the behalf of principal. However, there is a difference between governance and management 
where governance is about leading the firm and in the meanwhile it is also to make certain a 
I 
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proper control and monitoring of administration activities in help of achieving the organization's 
objectives. In contrast, management runs the firm to achieve 9orporate objectives that have been 
organized by board of directors like the setting yearly budget, making and directing strategic 
plans of the firm. 
Furthermore, the boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their firm. The 
directors and auditors are appointed to educate the shareholders and to ensure that the firms 
apply appropriate governance. In short, we can say that management is about running the firm 
and governance assure that firm is running appropriately. 
The corporate governance terms have been used in numerous different ways as well as its 
limitations of the subject Maher and Andersson (1999). These are two different models of 
corporation which has been designated by corporate governance, namely the stockholder 
(insider) model and the shareholder (outsider) model. The stockholder model emphasized that 
stockholder might contribute to firm's long term performancf and shareholder value as well as 
the priority of control goes to stakeholders. Whereas, the business ethics and stakeholder relation 
may give an impact on the long term and reputation of the firm m shareholder model as 
shareholder have priority in the market regulation. 
Another way of stating the stakeholder model according to Mayer (1996) is that it illustrates an 
extensive view of the firm where firm needs wider voters of stakeholders as well besides 
shareholders. Furthermore, the performance of this model is judged by large voters who attracted 
in employment, market share, financial performance and growth in trading relations with 
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suppliers and purchasers. Conversely, maximizing the shareholder wealth is the goals of the 
shareholder model and market value of the firm is indicator for model performance. 
The separation of ownership and managerial of decision-making in this model is a root in arising 
of the agency problem in corporate governance as both shareholder and management interests 
are different. Therefore, Shleiifer and Vishny (1997) conclude that the main concerns in 
corporate governance is to bring into line the interest between investors and managers in order to 
ensure that the external fund is flow into the firm as well ~s returns in investment for those 
financiers. 
According to Shleifer and Vi shy ( 1997), corporate governanc:ce mechanisms can be changes via 
political process as they are economic and legal institution. Investors will gain some power from 
legal protection and financial concentration as both are most common approaches in corporate 
governance. 
Legal protection will protect shareholders from being expropdate by managers and to protect the 
rights of minority as well. Whereas, shareholders are equivaltrnt to the regulator rights and cash 
flow rights. The problem of corporate governance arises b~cause of financial and control is 
separated, since the firm is run by the managers might choose to achieve their own personal 
objectives but this may not be in the best for shareholder's interest. 
As the firm's objective is to maximize the wealth of shareholder, while the firm run by manager 
who does not have the same interests as shareholders, this is causes the agency cost to rise. 
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Furthermore, principal-agent problem is complex as it involves more than monetary incentives to 
decide and the agent having more information is called as asyrµmetry information. 
According to Mayer (1996), corporate governance problems are more severe in large firms as the 
transaction of shares continuously buy and sell shareholders. Hence, improvements of corporate 
governance have mainly focused on the listed firm and slightly focused on private firms and 
smaller public firms. 
In corporate governance, internal stakeholders and external stakeholders are the main players. 
The board of directors, shareholders and management are the internal stakeholders; while 
creditors, auditors, customers, suppliers, government agency, and the community are the external 
stakeholders. 
The conflict of interests between managers and shareholders are same as the conflict of interest 
between the controlling and minority shareholders, as both stands at the key of corporate 
governance literature. Shareholder that holds more than half of the shares (majority) of the 
outstanding shares in a firm is called controlling shareholder. 
Although the shareholders might hold a smaller percentage of shares in the firm but they can be a 
controlling shareholders as well, if there is a significant numbtir of remaining shares. As contrast, 
shareholder that holds less than 50 percent of the total shares of the firm is categorized as 
minority shareholders. 
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However, a minority shareholder does not have the voting control over the corporation as 
I 
controlling shareholder does; and they cannot elect the direct9rs of the corporation by their own 
or influence any decision made at general meeting. 
2.4 Empirical studies on the relationship between agency cost and financial performance 
2.4.1 Dependent Variables 
There are two performance measures that are utilized as dependent variables in this analysis. The 
selection of variables is guided based on previous study results that have been commonly used in 
corporate governance studies. Basically, the variables used to measure performance which is 
accounting measures. 
According to Gentry and Shen (2010) the use of accounting methods as measure of the company 
financial performance had been debated over two decades, Accounting based is backward-
looking in term of time perspective and estimate of what management has accomplished without 
affected by investor psychology. 
The dependent variable that are considered as performance indicators to measure accounting 
performance is return on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Whereas, market based is 
forward-looking in term of time perspective and estimate what management will accomplish. 
Furthermore, investors' psychology strongly influenced th~ market based as it affects the 
predictions in whole which also includes the results of the curnent business policies. 
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Since accounting and market based replicate different persprctives for firm performance, thus 
this study uses both measures to evaluate firm performance. The dependent variables that are 
considered as performance indicators to measure accounting performance is return on asset 
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE). 
2.4.1.1 Return on Assets (ROA) 
Return on assets (ROA) is a measure of profit per dollar of a~sets. It is an indication that shows 
how profitable a firm is relative to its total assets. A higher ROA suggests that the firm is more 
profitable with less investment. According to Richard at al. (2009) accounting measures have 
numerous strengths as they are widely needed and the government also requires organizations to 
declare financial data and the companies are also subjected to internal controls which enhance 
the reliability of the financial data. ROA is widely used in many studies to measure firm's 
performance such as Mehran (1995), Wiwattanakantang (1999), Chu and Cheah (2004), Lefort 
and Walker (2007), Fauzias et al. (2010), and Francis et al. 
Return on Assets (ROA) is defined as the ratio of earnings before interests and taxes to total 
assets. In the other words to show how effectively the firm uses its assets. This ratio is important 
to both the owners and investors as it indicates how effec~ively the firm's assets are being 
managed. The higher the value of ratio, the better it is for the firm, since it implies the firm that 
the firm is generating more revenues per dollar of assets. 
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The value of ROA shows how much a company can geneFate profits by utilizing its assets. 
Investors would prefer companies with higher ROA because ~hey are capable of producing high 
level of corporate profiles than those with lower ROA. It also measures the degree in which the 
assets have been used to generate profits. The higher the Renpn on Assets (ROA) the better the 
company' s performance, this is because it also increases the rnte ofreturn on investment. 
Many studies used ROA as one of the performance measures, for example Yermack (1996), 
Eisenberg et al. (1998), Wiwattanakantang (1999), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Cheng Wu et al. 
(2009), Fauzias et al. (2010), Manawaduge (2012), Hogberg (~012) and Restrepo (2014). 
2.4.1.2 Return on Equity (ROE) 
Return on equity (ROE) is the ratio of net profit divided by the equity invested in a company. 
ROE does not specify the cash amount which will be returned to the shareholder because 
dividend payout is based on management decision and stock price increase depends on market 
forces. However, it is said to be a good sign that a company is capable enough to generate a 
return which is worth the risk of investment (Berman, Knight ~nd Case, 2013). 
A study by Irawan (2011) shows that the ROE does affect the profit growth where the result is 
due to the nature and outline of investments made by the organization which is precise so that the 
assets which they have can be used efficiently and the same tiive it can maximize the profit. 
The greater the ratio of the net profit margin in an organizat~on the better the profit will be. A 
higher net profit margin (NPM) shows that increase in the cf mpany net profit to the net sales 
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(Harahap, 2007). In another research by Irawan (2011) have proved that the net profit margin 
(NPM) does effect on the profit margin. This is due to company has higher Net Profit Margin 
(NPM) will have high growth earnings and vice versa. 
A high Net Profit Margin (NPM) indicates that the compapy has the ability to increase the 
business through achievement in operating profit. Through this achievement, investors will get a 
I 
positive image of the performance of the company so that they also can expect a higher return on 
the equity. In other words, it can be said that growth in earnings shall also increase. 
2.4.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables for this study are number of directors, number of independent 
directors, firm size, leverage and cash flow. 
2.4.2.1 Number of Directors 
Number of directors in an organization can influence the company' s business because the board 
generally has the authority to approve the management to borrow, mortgage or change 
company' s asset or debts . 
The importance of number of directors in an organization is stated by Schleifer and Vishny 
(1997) as one of the key factors of corporate governance. 
The role of a director in an organization can be viewed as one who ensures that the management 
achieves the purpose of the organization and runs the company accordingly. He or she also 
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decides the partners pertinent to the organization and creates a policy so that proper 
management system is in place. 
Contribution in the everyday administration of the organization or being in the full-time salaried 
vocation of the organization or both, characterizes the direct~rs' role. A director through his or 
her privileged position has an intimate information of the w~rkings of the organization. There 
can, along these lines, be an imbalance in the sum and nrture of data with respect to the 
organization's issues controlled by directors. 
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) of 2000 recommends that the board 
ought to incorporate a certain number of independent directors independent so as to guarantee 
that the board's basic leadership is not ruled by a specific grpup. The prescribed procedures of 
the code suggest that the obligations of the director and the executives not be held by the same 
individual to avoid decisions that reflect self-interest which can be detrimental to the company. 
I 
The arrangements to the board should be made by a structured board of trustees and the 
executives to ensure that it comprises of highly experien
1
ced and caliber members. Other 
components of corporate administration incorporate review tioards of trustees and an effective 
inside control structure. 
According to Baron (2003), around 75% of market value depfnds on intangible resources, most 
remarkably human capital, which is one of the segments of in~ellectual capital. However, there is 
a small record that is taken for the individuals to make achievements for the organization. The 
effect of intellectual capital by business sectors is vast as it has value created for long term 
advancement. 
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Baron (2003) has also explained that advanced economies and intellectual capital is the main 
resource which can't be imitated effectively, particularly human capital which incorporates skills, 
I 
ability, inspiration, and know-how of individuals. 
The basic target for these directions and proposals is to make a strong management team that can 
play out its stewardship requirements and ensure the interests of the shareholders are met. This 
suggests certain board qualities may lead to better corporate e:Xtecution. 
Furthermore, corporate execution should be measured utilizing a long haul pointer, rather than 
the all the more regularly utilized here and now financial propprtions. This is to decide the effect 
of the board structure on the maintainable performance of the ~ompany. Hence, the measurement 
of corporate performance needs to include the firm ' s number of directors involved. 
Directors also carry an additional duty Such as ensuring that tbe data laid before the board by the 
management is an exact impression of their comprehension of the undertakings of the 
organization. A person in the all day job of the holding organization is likewise viewed as a 
director of a subsidiary organization unless the individual, by behavior or official power, 1s 
included in the everyday administration of the subsidiary. 
The bigger the sizes of top managerial staff are, the more cap~ble individuals with careers would 
be incorporated. These experts could give proficient learning in money or non-fund angle. For 
instance, the more directors and free who own budgetary an,d lawful careers, the more expert 
sentiments could be proposed while the basic leadership <;>f the organization, which could 
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enhance the execution of the organization (Bacon, 1973). T~e bigger scale the top managerial 
staff is, the consequences for the working execution of the organization would be bigger. 
Several studies have shown that i the greater the size of top managerial staff, the lower the 
supervision impacts would be, and this would adverselr impact the execution of the 
organization. A few researchers likewise suggested that bigger size of top managerial staff would 
make the sentiments from every director unique in relatlion to each other all the more 
I 
significantly and would bring about the low quality in top managerial staff. This will further 
influence the auspiciousness of different decision making. 
At the point when discuss the shareholding proportion of extrcutive ' s directors, the exploration 
results got from researchers shows that the more share held by the directors the self-interest 
components would urge them to be committed to raise the operation productivity of organization 
and it would be more outlandish for them to do condu~t anything which unfriendly to 
organization and shareholders. 
Consequently, their objective would have a tendency to meet with shareholders' , 
AshbaughSkaife, Collins and Lafond (2006). The ownership level in a company is a way the 
firm can provide for the directors for them to increase the inteitest and perform better in their job. 
The proportions of ownership can determine whether the directors have personal interest to 
perform well in the company and increase the company performance (Cole et al., 2002). 
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2.4.2.2 Number of Independent Directors 
Independent director ' s presence on the board has an important influence on the firm's financially 
well beings. They are important they produce unbiased tl1oughts in regards of company' s 
I 
decision makings and have different experience to the decis}on making overall process. Their 
role's also consists as supervisor towards the management and to protect the shareholder' s 
interest. 
Independent directors do not engage with an organization on a full presence and they are not 
entitled for a fixed compensation and yet their presence is important in doing the monitoring 
activities for the board committee. 
A study by Chouchene (2010) shows the aspects that impacts the independency of the director 
have been discussed in many studies recently but only few had examined on the elements that 
I 
determine the independent director's presence on board and tp.ere is yet a significance for them 
to ensure the protection of shareholder' s interest. 
An independent director is someone who does not tied to the organization, where he or she has 
no personal interest towards the organization (Goo & CarveJf, 2003). Therefore, it can be also 
concluded that an independent director is someone who has do personal interest in monetary or 
I 
even any association with management which can jeopardb e their judgments (Muhiudeen, 
2010). 
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As we see in perspective of an independent director, a perso~ who is free from any business or 
other relationship with the organization. The decision makling and the transparency can be 
influenced by the family ties and the cross-directorship. It also could affect the decision making 
I 
power and their involvement toward the organization a~ well (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Independent directors are described as the backbone of goo~ administration (Editorial, 2003). 
They are also considered to be a certification of the respectability and responsibility of 
I 
organization boards. 
An independent director is also defined as a person who has no association with the firm aside 
from their directorship (Clifford & Evans, 1997). There are some deceptive assumptions that the 
board with independent directors makes difference and also petter decisions than the on board 
dominated directors. 
They are important people in a company because they tend to have indirect connection towards 
the company and they do not entertain any self-interest and make a wrong decision for the 
I 
company (Clifford & Evans, 1997). 
In Malaysia, majority listed companies has practiced and fulfiUed the requirements of having one 
third of independent director on their board of directors (Ch@ng, 2009) although they are fully 
free from management and practiced enough to assist in decision making. 
Since an independent director' s presence on boards has its @wn structures and yet has hardly 
I 
been studies, hopefully this present study will provide reafonable findings to what are the 
elements that influence the presence of independent directors ~s board of directors. 
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2.4.2.3 Firm Size 
The perspective of firm size is taken into consideration. It is strongly supported by Dess and 
Robinson (1984) that an organization's profitability is depends on the firm size in terms of asset 
growth. 
This is most applicable to organizations which are running from a small business. This can be 
explained as. Since performance can be measured in many dimensions, firm size is valued 
through parting the large and small organizations. 
The size of a firm is the capacity and capability of a firm possesses to produce the services to 
customers and this will be the prime factor of the company' s profitability. '.fhe size of a firm is 
an essential factor in deciding the benefit of a firm because of the economies of scale which can 
be found in the traditional perspective of the firm. 
It is found that in smaller firms, things can be delivered on much lower costs by greater firms. A 
positive relationship between firm size and company performance is normal. In spite of this, 
larger firms go under the control of directors seeking and in this manner administrative work 
may substitute benefit strengthening of the organizations' goal work. 
It has been discussed that the larger the size of an organization, the higher will be the risk to be 
taken (Alchian, 1965). This is explained as the larger firms may have advantage over the small 
rivals. The large firms can actually gain advantage from the ~trong economics of scale and the 
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power. This ultimately turns out that bigger firms have higher risk m engagmg into the 
economics of scale. 
Firm size can also be a determinant of company performance. This is explained such as usually a 
larger company is assumed to be more established and it could operate and perform far way 
better than the smaller companies. It is also discussed by Jen~en & Meckling (1976) that larger 
companies have high agency cost because the shareholder tel[l-d to face difficulties in observing 
the top management. 
A study by Hall and Weiss (1967) has tested on the relationship between firm' s performance 
with variables such ah firm size. The output shows that lar~e firms have choice to take over 
small firms, this adds the ability to increase scales and access to capital market thus this leads to 
higher profit rates. 
Thus, it can be implied that larger firm size has access to profitable market segments. The 
empirical relationship between firm' s size and company performance has been found 
significantly correlated (Gichura, 2011). 
In contrast, Jermanis (2006) shows that larger firm size can increase coordination requirement. 
This will lead the managerial tasks more difficult as it wip create inefficiencies and lower 
performance to the company. 
It is also being discussed that increased firm size tends to be linked with higher administrative 
management in other words more bureaucratic. Indirectly higher bureaucratic managements lead 
to inefficient decision making process. 
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Board of director is an important mechanism for corporate ~ovemance because they have the 
internal access to the information, disclosure, and also current arid future information of a 
company (Cianci & Falsetta 2008). 
The relationship between the firm size and company performaµce can be seen on how productive 
the board is when they have large or small size. It can be mea~ured whether the amount of board 
of director and their contribution in achieving better company performance. 
It depends on the communication and coordination of either th,e large board or the small board in 
how amount of directors react in making decision for the C011i1pany in have a good performance 
(Yermack, 1996). 
2.4.2.4 Leverage 
The leverage is basically determined as the total debt to total equity of a company. This gives the 
managers to look into the external resources and the ways to p1ogress the effective and efficiency 
of the equity level. 
In 1985, Modigliani and Miller describes that leverage does not give effect to the company 
value. As the years goes the other authors such as Myers (1984) refers that there is practical 
impact of the leverage towards the company performance. It is also argued by some writers that 
the level of leverage is determined by the debt to equity analysis which totally depends on the 
trade between the cost of the financial and the interest which derives from tax (Kim, 1997 and 
Sheel, 1994). 
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If we look into future development opportunities and financial policy, it is a common issue in 
capital markets. There are two types of financial leverage which are market value of equity and 
book value of equity. In capital markets we usually see impact of capital structure on profit value 
of a firm (Higgins, 1997). 
The important duty of corporate administrators is to increase the belongings of participators, 
increase of investment and capital cost should be diminished. Through this, we can conclude 
from the hypothesis of capital structure that cost of outside equity reduces through the high 
leverage. 
Organizations with larger size, they achieve scale of economies by getting all new technology 
and obtaining funds at lower level of cost. From this we can ail.so know that bigger organizations 
have even more higher benefits compared to smaller companies. This will indirectly affect the 
investors and creditors with surplus cash and leverage. 
A study by Gunay (2002) shows that having a lower level of leverage can protect a company 
against economic crisis. The development of capital markets is crucial to high leverage firms 
because they are more opt to financial distress. This may lead to high amount of debt to the high 
leverage organizations if the crisis occurs. Apart from that, profits by high leverage firms can be 
increased by issuance of equity or reducing the debt. However
1 
debt for high leverage firms can't 
be reduced during the post crisis period of time. The correct financial decisions depend on the 
margin of funding that organizations expect in moving years. It should certain the organizations 




Butters (1949) explains that organizations will decide how 1 uch debt and equity finance they 
need by evaluating the costs and benefits of each. The management should definitely assess the 
I 
cost and benefits to get the optimum leverage strategy and to establish a good balance to avoid 
bankruptcy. 
Previous study by Ofek (1993) explains the relationship between leverage and company 
performance. The high leveraged firms are more possible to restructure assets and lay off 
employees often when the company performance depreciates. Other than that, high leveraged 
firms also react quickly in financial through reducing divide~ds and reshuffling their debts and 
avoid bankruptcy. Optimal amount of leverage is also a meclh.anism from corporate governance 
perspectives. The corporate governance discusses the syste1fls of controls in an organization, 
regulations and incentives which is developed to optimize fra~d level in an organization. 
In a study by Berk & DeMarzo (2007), it was shown that leyerage can help to reduce the cash 
flow amount. Indirectly by reducing the cash flow amount, it prevents organization from 
I 
investing in negative NPV projects, thus it will increase firm's performance. 
2.4.2.5 Cash Flow 
Every company uses cash flow as a method to measure theirt company financial health. Other 
than seeing it as a value for cash flows, it is also used to recognize the performance in the 
company. Cash flow is also an important aspect to look over because the effects links to risk 
level of a company. Despite the performance it also plans t nd control the current assets and 
liabilities which again controls the risk and avoids the over investment on the assets (Eljelly, 
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2004). Normally companies measure profit by minimizing the current ratio, increasing the cash 
flow cycle and make the profits in accordance with the risk. This indicates that the cash flow has 
high potential in increasing the liquidity and also the returns (Deloof, 2003). 
Earnings information is important for the investors to decide and examine a firm' s performance 
and to understand the future prospect of the business. The qui lity of earnings should be high in 
stock markets which rely more on cash flow information when the investors value a firm (Cheng, 
2003). 
In another study Chung et al. (2005) .claimed that the motive of the good cash flow is the self-
interest of the managers which may give them a high level of control over the firm' s overall 
.. 
control. Therefore, managers may take non-optimal actions such as making lower level 
investments which indirectly increases the agency cost and requces firm' s cash flow value. 
This self-interest motive can influence the ability to estimatf the cash flow because it creates 
false perceptions. Rahman and Mohd-Saleh (2008) explains that due to inaccurate statements, the 
stock market gives low approach to the earnings of the firm!'; which leads to cash flow agency 
problems. Firms with high agency problems in terms of cash flows tend to manipulate and 
misattribute the income information' s. Thus, the value of earnings would reduce for firms with 
high cash flow agency problems. 
In another study by Vogt (1994) argues that cash flow agency problem recognizable among the 
large organizations and the investment relationship differs according to tfirms' size. Large 
growth organization agrees and follows more to cash flor agency whereas small growth 
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organization chooses to go for picking order theory because tpey concern on utilizing their own 
fund internally. 
A study by Harford (2008) found that a good corporate governance instrument is established in 
large organizations. Therefore, the effectiveness of the mech;anism is expected in reducing the 
cash flow problem and improve the earnings which is expected to be high than the smaller 
organizations. Large firms should decrease market control or prepare a better market dominance 
if they have a good cash flow. Apparently, managers in larger firms have the mutual rights to use 
the available cash flow to develop the organization, where this indirectly creates more benefits. 
On the other hand, small firms have less cash flow problems lj,ecause they have the capability to 
control the spending ' s done unwisely. Other than that a study by Ahmed and Ali (2013) explains 
at the management level the ability of investors to estimate future cash flow is showed in how 
they predict the earnings. The estimated cash flow by the stakeholders is very important in 
valuing the firm because they invest in an organizations bt sed on the earnings qualities. In 
contrast, Velury and Jenkins (2006) explained that the values of earning numbers is outward in 
the use of accounting numbers in predicting the equity estimation and this makes the investors to 





This chapter discusses the methodology of the study. This chapter also discusses the theoretical 
framework based on the firm performance followed by hypothesis development, methods used to 
get the results of relationship between firm performances, number of board of directors, number 
of independent board of directors, firm size, leverage and cash flow that affect firm performance. 
Finally, this chapter explains the measurement, data collection and techniques of data analysis. 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
Figure 3.1 Theoretical Framework 
Independent Variables Dependent 
CG Mechanisms Variables 
( Board of Directors l Corporate Financial 
> ( l Performance Independent BOD • ROA [ Firm size l • ROE 
[ Leverage l 
[ Cash Flow l 
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Figure 3.1 shows the theoretical framework that build for this study in order to examine the 
effect of corporate governance on firm performance. The figure shows ROA and ROE as the 
measurement for the firm performance that are determined by number of board of directors, 
number of independent board of directors, firm size, leverage and cash flow. 
3.2 Hypotheses Development 
3.2.1 Board of directors 
The results on the relationship between ownership structures and corporate financial 
performance appear to be mixed in several previous studies. The findings of several past studies 
show that stock price return is significantly and positively rehjlted with ownership concentration. 
For example, in the study by Mitton (2002), the findings show that stock return may increase by 
10% when the ownership is mainly concentrated among the few largest shareholders. Besides 
that, study by Rechner (1993) has also pointed that the number of directors also plays the 
important role as it is affected by the decision making process in an organization. 
Several other studies, however, show that companies with good governance system have actually 
generated risk-adjusted excess returns for their shareholders. Hence, if an institutional investor 
invests in companies with good corporate governance records, it will actually help its own 
shareholders. Therefore, hypothesis 1 of this study is as follows; 
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between board of directors and corporate financial 
performance. 
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3.2.2 Independent Board of Directors (BOD) 
The results on the relationship between an independent board of director (BOD) and corporate 
financial performance appear to be mixed. The findings of previous studies however, show no 
significant relationship between the composition of the board of director and corporate financial 
performance using market based date or accounting based data!. 
For example, Brown and Caylor (2004) found that companies with independent BOD have 
higher return on equity, higher profit margins, larger dividends yield and larger stock 
repurchases compared to companies without independent board of directors. Besides that, 
Baysinger (1990) argued that the independent directors have lljlOre efficient ideas and importance 
to serve the firm. The decisions they do is most likely in favor of management. Hence, based on 
the previous research done, the formation of hypothesis can be made; 
H2: There is a significant relationship between corporate finahcial performance and the number 
I 
independent boards of directors (BOD) 
3.2.3 Size of the company 
The results on the relationship between board size and corporate financial performance appear to 
I 
be mixed. Past research found that firm size is significantly has positive relationship with 
I 
company performance (Dehaene et al. , 2001). However, the ),iesults of Haniffa et al. (2006) are 
indecisive. 
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Y ermack (1996) finds an inverse relationship between firm size and firm value; in addition, 
financial ratios related to profitability and operating efficienoy also appear to decline as board 
size grows. Finally, Connelly and Limpaphayom (2004) find that board size does not have any 
relation with firm performance. 
H3: There is a significant relationship between the firm size anp corporate financial performance. 
3.2.4 Leverage 
Control variables are used in these studies to minimize the effect of unrelated variables that are 
not commonly being studied. This is where the control for a variable holds the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables. This is w1y leverage and cash flow is being 
used in this study. 
The results on the relationship between leverage and corporate financial performance appear to 
I 
be mixed. In a study by Gu (1993), corporate financial perff rmance is found to be negatively 
related to the leverage in a company. It shows that companies which use less debt tend to record 
higher profitability. 
Similar findings have anticipated on the effect of leverage t9wards the profit management and 
risk level. For instance, Elgonemy (2002) explained that the j ore a firm incurs liability, the less 
the firm pays tax and indirectly they are absorbing the risk. 
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Besides, larger firms usually have few businesses compared to the small firms thus the risk level 
is lower. Hence, based on the previous research done the formation of hypothesis can be made. 
H4: There is a significant relationship between corporate finaneial performance and leverage 
I 
3.2.5 Cash flow 
The results on the relationship between cash flow and corpora,te financial performance appear to 
be mixed. Previous studies have indicated that there is negative significant relationship between 
the profit and liquidity level of a firm (Eljelly, 2004). 
In another study by Nezami (2006), it is shown that there is a positive relationship between cash 
flow and the profitability. The cash flow is often seen performance analyzer as it indirectly 
shows the firms value and quality of the firm (Hussainey, 2009). This is where the total earning 
and the profit are precisely influencing each other to influence the firm's value. 
Hs: There is a significant relationship between the corporate financial performance and cash flow 
I 
3.3 Research Design 
This study is designed to find the relationship between de~endent variables and independent 
variables that is to examine the relationships between number of board of directors, number of 
independent board of directors, firm size, cash flow, leveragl and firm performance which are 
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measured by Return on Asset (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) for the listed companies on 
main market at Bursa Malaysia. 
Secondary data was used for this study. The annual reports of companies were retrieved from the 
Bursa Malaysia website. The data collected from the annual report were the net income, current 
assets, total assets, current liability, non-current liability, total equity, the total number of 
ordinary shares, the total number of shareholders, number of directors and number of 
independent directors. The population of this study is the total listed companies in Main Market 
of Bursa Malaysia that consists of Top 100 companies. In this study, 100 firms are selected from 
the population as a sample. Stratified sampling techniques are used to work out at the sample in 
which the populations are divided into different sectors. The d~ta collected for the firms are from 
year 2009-201 2. Table 3 .1 shows the sectorial analysis of the sample firms . 
3.4 Sample Description 
Table 3.2 Sectorial Analysis of the sample 
Industry /Sector No of Companies 
Finance 11 
Trading & Service I 46 
Plantation I 8 
Industrial Product I 7 
Consumer Product I 10 








Table 3 .1 shows the sector distribution of the 100 companies that are chosen in the sample of the 
study. There are 9 sectors which comprises of finance, trading and services, plantation, industrial 
product, consumer product, infrastructure project, construction, property and technology. From 
the table it is shown that trading and services sector has the most number of companies in total of 
46 companies, and the sector with the least companies is the technology sector which has total of 
1 company. 
3.5 Measurement/ Instruments of Variables 
In this study the variables consist of two categories which is dependent variables and 
independent variables. Measurements of variables are one o:f the important parts in this study. -
The independent variables affect the dependent variables; thus the results will be analyzed based 
on that. The dependent variables are categorized as Return on Asset (ROA) and Return on Equity 
(ROE). 
The independent variables are categorized as number of directors, number of independent board 
of directors, firm size, cash flow and leverage. All the variables are widely used in many studies 
of corporate governance and financial performance since year 80 ' s up to current year. Table 3.2 
provides summary of the measurement used in this study and Table 3 .3 shows the measurement 
of each variable for the dependent and independent variables. 
42 
Table 3.3 Table of Variables 
Dependent Variables Acronym 
Return on Asset ROA 
Return on Equity ROE 
Independent Variables Acronym 
Number of Directors BOD 
Number of Independent Board of Directors IBOD 
Firm Size SIZE 
Cash Flow CF 
.. Leverage LV 
Table 3.4 Table of Key Concept 
VARIABLES MEASUREMENT 
I 
Number of directors The total number of directors on the board 
I 
Number of Independent board of Number of 
directors (BOD) 
indep~ndent directors 
Firm Size Natural log of total asset 
Cash flow Natural log of totcjll cash and cash equivalent 
Leverage Total liabilities 
Total equity 
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3.6 Techniques of Data Analysis 
Data analysis is conducted for the year 2009 to year 2012. Tlilree types of analysis are tested in 
this study, namely, s descriptive analysis, correlation analysis and regression analysis. All of 
these three analyses were analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics 19. 
3.6.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive statistics analysis is used to analyze and interprnt the data of dependent variables 
such as ROA and ROE and independent variables such as number of board of directors, number 
of independent board of directors, board size, cash flow and leverage. Furthermore, the use of 
descriptive analysis is to summarize the sample and to describe the main features of the data 
collected for all the sampled firms. The study used statistical techniques such as mean, median, 
standard deviation, minimum and maximum. 
3.6.2 Correlation Analysis 
Correlation analysis is a statistical technique to identify the deJi)endence of two or more variables. 
The correlation coefficient values lie between + 1 and -1. Any value that more than 0.5 shows 
positive correlation, whereas value that is less than 0.5 shows negative correlations. Correlation 
coefficient is important to determine the relationship ancl correlation between dependent 
I 
variables such as ROA and ROE and independent variable~ such as as number of board of 
directors, number of independent board of directors, board size, cash flow and leverage. 
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3.6.3 Regression Analysis 
This analysis helps to explain the linear relationship and equation between the factors or the 
variables. In other words, regression analysis helps us to understand how the typical value of the 
I 
dependent variable changes when any one of the independent r ariables is varied, while the other 
independent variables are held fixed . The goal of this an~lysis is to predict the dependent 
variables using the independent variables. If there is only one independent variable is examined, 
then it known as simple regression while multiple regression er-plains the techniques if more than 
one independent variable been used. Therefore, this researcr is done based on the empirical 
model shown below: 
Where, 
ROA= Return On Assets 
ROE= Return On Equity 
po= Intercept 
Dir= Number of directors 
Fsize= FirmSize 
IndBOD= Independent Board of Directors 
CFlow= Cash Flow 
Lev= Leverage 




3. 7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides discussion on the theoretical frarework followed by hypothesis 
development, research design, data collection, measurement of variables, regression model and 
data analysis. Furthermore, this study examines five hypoth~ses that focus on the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance. Definitlion, acronym and measurement of 
the variables were disclosed in detail. Lastly, this chapter exp~ains the analysis used in this study 




DISCUSSION OF RESUL'I;'S 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the data analysis and the study findings, which comprises of descriptive 
statistics, correlation matrix of variables and regression analysis. The analysis of this study 
relates to the research objectives, research questions and hypothesis that were developed in the 
previous chapters. The analyses were conducted using SPSS s©ftware and Microsoft Excel. 
4.2 Industry Classification 
Table 4.1 Industry Classification 
Industry /Sector No of Companies 
Finance 11 
Trading & Service 46 
Plantation 8 
Industrial Product 7 
Consumer Product 10 
Infrastructure Proi ect Company 2 
Construction 6 
Property 9 I 
Technology 1 I 
Total 100 I 
I 
Table 4.1 shows the sector distribution of the 100 companies that are chosen in the sample of the 
study. There are 9 sectors which comprises of finance, trading and services, plantation, industrial 
product, consumer product, infrastructure project, constructioq, property and technology sectors. 
From the table it is shown that trading and services sector has the most number of companies in 
total of 46 companies, and the sector with the least companies is the technology sector which has 
total of 1 company. 
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4.3 Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive statistics of all variables are presented in the Table 4.2 below: 
Table 4.2 Summary of Descriptive Statistics for Return on Asset 
D . f St f f escnp· 1ve a IS ICS 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std . Deviation 
I 
ROA 100 .0000 .4987 .081570 .0766588 
ROE 100 .0000 1.7588 .179871 .2458282 
BOD 100 4.0000 14.0000 9.34500Q 2.0467330 
IBOD 100 2.0000 7.5000 4.495000 1.2086494 
SIZE 100 19.0681 26.6921 22.418014 1.6240073 
I 
LV 100 .0232 .9380 .489487 .2338353 
CF 100 8.9J319 24.2678 19.803178 2.2935354 
Valid N (listwise) 100 
Descriptive results of all firms as summarized in Table 4.2 shows the mean of ROA is 8.15% 
with minimum value of 0.00% and maximum value of 49.87%. For ROE the mean is 17.98% 
with minimum value of 0.00% and maximum value of 175.9%. The lower mean value of ROA 
compared to the ROE shows that on average, for the companies in the sample of the study, the 
total assets are significantly larger than the total equity, indicating a high proportion of debt. 
For independent variables, the mean numbers of director sittimg in Board of Directors (BOD) of 
I 
the public listed companies is 9.34 with a minimum of 4 and al maximum of 14. These results are 
also in line with the results of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) w'o conducted a similar research in 
Malaysia. For the Independent Board of Director (IBOD) variables, the mean is 4.49 with a 
minimum of 2.0 and a maximum of 7.5. The study conducted by Mishra (2001) and 
Subrahmanyam (1997), reported similar results states that the better the board of directors 
manage the organizations the lesser the intervention of independent directors to the management. 
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For size (SIZE) the mean is 22.41 which is equivalent to RM 5.4 billion with a minimum value 
of 19.06 which is equivalent to RM 1.89 million and maximum value of 26.69 which is 
equivalent to RM 390 billion. For Leverage (LV) the mean is 48.94% with a minimum value of 
0% and maximum value of 93 .8%. This shows that on average, the total liabilities of the 
companies selected in the sample are almost half that of the to~al equity. 
Finally, for cash flow (CF) the mean is 19.8 which is equivalent to RM 3.97 million with a 
minimum value of 8.96 which is equivalent to RM 7 thousand and maximum value of 24.26 
which is equivalent to RM 34 billion. 
When ROA or ROE is less than 1.0 it indicates that shareholders are probably being overly 
pessimistic about the future assets or equity returns (Mihaljevic, 2019). This also simply explains 
that if ROA is high, ROE should be high as well because this shows that managers are doing a 
good job in generating returns from shareholder' s investment. Otherwise, if ROA is low and 
company financial performance is not good and if the R(])E is high, this could give false 
impression about the company good doing to the shareholders. 
The mean value of ROA found in this study and previous studies about Malaysia firms such as 
Claessens et al. (2000), Ishak and Napier (2006), Haniffa ~nd Hudaib (2006) and Rahimah 
(2011) is higher than those previous studies in other countries. For instance, Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), La Porta et al. (1999) and Maher and Andersson (2000) who studied firms in US, UK, 
Japan and Netherlands, reported the mean value for return on asset are 25.4%, 14.4%, 33.1 % and 
26.9%, respectively. 
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The mean value of ROE is 17.98% with minimum value of 0.00% and maximum value of 175%. 
I 
This indicates that Malaysia listed firms has more debt th~ equity. However, the ROEs vary 
widely across the sectors included in this study. Higher debt level also indicates that firms in 
Malaysia have been aggressive in financing its growth with debt as Malaysia is an emerging 
country (Driffeld et al., 2007). 
4.4 Correlation Analysis 
The purpose of correlation analysis is to describe the correlation between two variables. Other 
than that the correlation is done to test the multicollinearity, where the multicollinearity refers to 
high correlations among independent variables. Correlation with coefficient greater than 0. 7 
poses a problem of multicollinearity (Coakes & Steed, 2003). As can be seen in table 4.3, none 
of the independent variables record high correlation coefficient, indicating that multicollinearity 
among them does not exist. 
so 
Table 4.3 Correlation analysis of the independent variables 
I 
BOD IBOD SIZE LV CF 
BOD Pearson Correlation 1 .594** .173 
I 
.125 .126 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .084 .215 .213 
IBOD Pearson Correlation .594** 1 .273** .249· -.012 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .006 .012 .905 
I 
SIZE Pearson Correlation .173 _273·· 1 _553·· .557** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .084 .006 .000 .000 
LV Pearson Correlation .125 _249· .553** 1 .221 · 
Sig. (2-tailed) .215 .012 .000 .027 
CF Pearson Correlation .126 -.012 .557°° .221 · 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .213 .905 .000 .027 
I 
Table 4.3 presents the correlation coefficients among the independent variables. Based on the 
results, significant correlations are observed between BOD and IBOD (0.594), between IBOD 
and SIZE (0.273), between IBOD and LV (0.249), between ~IZE and LV (0.553) and between 
SIZE and CF (0.557) . 
Previous studies by Yermack (1996) and Bhagat and Blacl,c (2002) have also supported the 
significance between IBOD and BOD where the number of independent directors influences the 
effectiveness of board. This is where board of directors plays the important role in performing 
I 
the essential functions in the organization. Although the number of independent directors does 
not have the highest involvement in the organizations, they are still involved in the decision 
making and it indirectly impacts the financial performance (C¥ter & Loarch, 2004). Large firms 
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have high number of directors which causes complexity of op~rations to arise as there is a greater 
need for advice and strategic input from the directors. 
The significant correlation between IBOD and Size is supported by Chen and Hambrick (1995) 
which found that the involvement of independent director in the organization's decision making 
does influence the size as in the asset management. Their deci1ion is taken into the consideration 
where in certain small organization the independent director does give financial advice to the 
organization in terms of reviewing the financial highlights. In contrast with this there is also a 
finding from Smith and Watts (1992) and Barclay and Smith (2005) which shows a negative 
relationship. 
The significant correlation between !BOD and Leverage is a s~milar finding with Davidson et al. 
(2005) where the attributes of an independent director will constrain the earning management. It 
is also proposing that independent directors can protect shareholders from other speculations as 
well. Furthermore, the finding is supported by Ahmed and Duf llman (2007) which indicates that 
independent board literally improves the financial quality in terms of debt management. 
The Size and Cash flow which has the significant correlation is supported by Goddard, Tavakoli 
and Wilson (2005). The organization which owns larger size in terms of shares may increase and 
produce good cash flow. In contrast to this finding, in the similar study Hergert (1984) also 
found the positive relationship between the size and cash flow but there was no significance. 
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4.5 Regression analysis 
4.5.1 ROA as the dependent variable 
Table 4.4 shows the output of the summary for the ordinary le(j.st square (OLS) regression with 
ROA as the dependent variable for all firms. 
Table 4.4 Model Summary ROA 
Model Summarv 
Adjusted R Std. Error of the 
Model R R Square Square Estimate 
1 .5038 .253 .214 .0679807 
a. Predictors: (Constant) , CF, 1800, LV, BOD, SIZE 
The above regression table (ROA as the dependent variable) was employed to examine the effect 
of number of board of directors (Hl), independent board of directors (H2), firm size (H3), 
leverage (H4) and cash flow (HS) towards company performance which is measured by return on 
assets (ROA). 
Based on the model summary statistics in table 4.4, the R2 of 0.253 indicates that on average, the 
independent variables included in the regression model can explain 25.3% of the variation in the 
ROA. The remaining 74.7% variation may be explained qy other variables which are not 
included in this study. 
In the study conducted by Bjarni Jonnson (2007) where the d,ependent variable is ROA and the 
independent variables are Leverage and Cash Flow the R2 is 36.2%, which is slightly higher than 
that this study. Other than that, a study by Dr Wassim (2011), who also used ROA as the 
dependent variable, of the resulting R2 is 41 %. 
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Table 4.5 Results of regression coefficients for ROA 
Coefficients3 
Standardized I 
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta I t SiQ. 
1 (Constant) .597 .094 I 6.371 .000 
SIZE -.023 .004 - 487 -5.514 nnn 
I 
Based on the regress10n results in table 4.5, SIZE is the only significant variable, with a 
coefficient of -0.023. This implies that the higher the size ofthe company, as measured by total 
assets, the lower would the ROA be. This negative relationspip between ROA and size is also 
found in the study by Goddard, Molyneux and Wilson (2004). 
A study by Becker et al. (2010) which examines the effect of firm size and profitability through 
the sectors in USA also resulted in negative and statistically significant relationship between 
total assets and profitability. Bankruptcy increases if the fi~ size decreases. Therefore, firm's 
size should be positively related on order to reduce the potenti~l bankruptcy. 
A study by Banchuenvijit (2012) with the similar result of l)legative relationship also explains 
that high asset utilization will generate good profit for the finlls· However, the study by Akhigbe 
and McNulty (2005) recorded positive and significant relatiollfhip between SIZE and ROA. It is 




4.5.2 ROE as the dependent variable 
Table 4.6 shows the output of the summary for the ordinary least square (OLS) regression with 
ROE as the dependent variable for all firms. 
Table 4.6 Model Summary ROE 
M S odel ummarv 
Adjusted R Std. Error of the 
Model R R Square Sauare Estimate 
1 .391 8 .153 .108 .2322325 
a. Predictors: (Constant) , CF, IBOD, LV, BOD, SIZE 
The above regression table (ROE as the dependent variable) was employed to examine the effect 
of number of board of directors (Hl ), independent board of directors (H2), firm size (H3), 
leverage (H4) and cash flow (HS) towards company performa11ce which is measured by return on 
equity (ROE). 
Based on the model summary statistics in table 4.6, the R2 is 15.3%, implying that together, the 
average variation of the independent variables selected in th) model can explain 15.3% of the 
variation in ROE. This shows that about 85% of the variation in ROE is not able to be explained 
by the independent variables, implying that there are other significant determining variables 
which are not included in this study. 
A study by Upneja and Dalbor (2001), which used ROE as the dependent variable and used 
Leverage as independent variable resulted in R2 as 19.4% which is more or less the same results 
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as this study. Another study by Bjarni Jonnson (2007) has a similar result in R2 as 11.9% which 
used Size as the independent variable and ROE as the dependent variable. 
I 
Table 4.7 Results of regression coefficients for ROE 
Coefficientsa 
Standardized 
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 1.342 .363 3.694 .000 
BOD -.016 .014 -.131 -1 .089 .279 
1800 -.011 .026 -.056 -.447 .656 
SIZE -.059 .021 -.392 -2.813 .006 
LV .403 .121 .383 3.318 .001 
CF .009 .013 .080 .673 .503 
a. Dependent Variable . ROE 
Based on the regression results in table 4.7, only SIZE and LEVERAGE are significant with a 
coefficient of -0.059 and 0.403 respectively. This implie~ that the higher the size of the 
company, as measured by total assets, the lower would the ROE will be. This is similar to the 
findings in the regression model using ROA as the dependent variable earlier. Generally, firm 
size does affect the company performance. Examples of study by Mansi and Agca (2008) and 
Peng (2001) have explained that firm size does affect co°rpany performance, where larger 
companies are more assorted than small companies. 
This is where they are less exposed to bankruptcy due to good management of the firm's. A 
study by Castanias (1983) has argued that smaller companies po not opt to borrow debt because 
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they worry on operational risk and they try to manage with SJnall amount they have. There is a 
study by Rajan and Zingales (1995) which gives a contra resul~s as negative relationship between 
size and company performance. They have explained that the c;hance of undervaluing new equity 
may decrease inappropriate information within the large comp~nies. 
This negative relationship between ROE and size is also found in the study by Goddard, 
Tavakoli and Wilson (2005) where the R2 is 20% and there is no significant relationship between 
the dependent variable and the independent variables. 
There is a positive relationship between the leverage and ROE and this is supported by Baskin 
( 1989) which also explains leverage increases the return on equity where firms with large equity 
are raised by monitored level of leverage. In contrast to this, study from Smith and Watts (1992) 
shows a negative relationship between ROE and Leverage. 
A study by Choi, Park & Yoo (2009) shows a contra results for number of independent board of 
directors, they found a positive significant relationship. They have explained that organization 
with higher number of independent directors will be m.ore effective in monitoring top 
management. The independent directors will monitor all th9 other directors in the board and 
makes sure they manage the organizations. 
Besides that, study by Scarabotti (2009) also shows a contradict result on number Independent 
I 
board of directors, where he also found a positive relationship compared to this study. He 
57 
explains that firms with higher number of independent directors become more profitable because 
they may act as a substitute of CEO who is responsible to builp the financial domains. 
Besides that, a study by Y ermack (1996) also resulted a positive relationship between number of 
directors and financial performance. He has explained that small numbers of directors in board 
have high advantage of better communication and easy to havy compromises among the directors 
and which indirectly makes the company to perform better. 
Other than that, a study by Pearce and Zahra (1992) has also <J. contradictory result on number of 
directors in the board compared to the results in this study. Jhey have explained such that the 
board is fulfilled with directors from diversified background and this may be a value add to the 
management as they provide instrumental outputs for the firms to excel in financial. On the other 
I 
hand, a study by Hermalin and Weisbach (2000) has resulted negative relationship and in line 
with this study where they derived that a high number of directors in board will increase the 
I 
possibility of free rider problems, it may not add any benefits to the firms. 
Supporting this, Shukeri, Shin and Shaari (2012) also supported that Malaysian firms with high 
number of directors have negative impact on the company performance. This happens when the 
I 
number of directors is high and the possibility of communic~tion barrier is also high therefore 
the motive of achieving high or good performance is difficult. The number of directors in board 
I 
is been criticized for causing the reduction in shareholder's wealth and some corporate failure. 
They have been the main reason for the fraud cases that had resulted to major failure in 
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corporations. Some of the reasons stated for these failures are lack of attention on the board and 
some directors who pursue their self-interest and results to negligence in accountability. This is 
also a reason for insignificant relationship between the number of directors in board and the 
I 





This chapter presents the summary of the results that obtained from the analysis that carried out 
from the present study. In this chapter also, the researcher provided the possible limitations that 
occurred during the study and suggestions for future research regarding the variable's 
relationship with the company performance. The objective to present this study was to examine 
the compliance of the Corporate Governance as well the factor that influence the corporate 
financial performance of the Malaysian listed 100 companies. 
It is based on the mechanism that has been tested to ensure the relationships strengthen the bonds 
between the factors towards the corporate performance. The five factors are Board of Directors, 
Independent Board of directors, Size of Board, Leverage and Cash flow. This is the mechanism 
which is highlighted in this study that covers a wide range of corporate governance policies both 
internal and external prospects. 
This chapter presents the findings with discussion and suggestions for future studies. This final 
chapter focuses on introduction, discussion on the study and lastly discusses the limitations and 
suggestions for future study. 
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5.1 Summary of Major Findings 
In conducting the research, the firms are chosen based on annt,1.al report available from year 2009 
to year 2012 in Bursa Website and the firm is listed in the main market. Furthermore, the criteria 
that has been taken to consideration is the firm's total asset should be more than RM 1 billion for 
large firm and for small firms the total assets in between of RN1 100 million and RM 999 million. 
The firms should have number of shareholders that own more than 5% outstanding shares at least 
one shareholder. 
This study examines the effect of corporate governance towards company performances with 
sample from Malaysia. The five research objectives are examined to find the relationship 
between five independent variables with company performance. 
Table 5.1 Summary of Findings 
Hypothesis Findings 
Hl: There is a significant relationship between corporatF financial Rejected 
performance and number of board of directors towards company 
performance. 
H2: There is a significant relationship between corporate financial Rejected 
performance and the independent boards of directors (BOD). 
H3: There is a significant relationship between corporate financial Accepted 
performance and size. 
H4: There is a significant relationship between corporat~ financial Accepted 
performance and leverage. 
H5: There is a significant relationship between corporat~ financial Rejected 
performance and cash flow. 
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It is found that firm size and leverage has a positive significan~ relationship whereas numbers of 
board of directors, number of independent board of directors, f1d cash flow has a non-significant 
relationship from the studies. 
5.2 Limitations 
The limitation of the study is the research is done based on 100 top companies sampling and 
according to Malaysian context of corporate governance. It will give effect to foreign users 
whom refer to the research where it can show adverse results. They might not have the same 
compliance of code as with this research. Secondly the research focus on only five variables 
from the corporate governance practices; this could give different results to the users if they use 
the other variables. 
Thirdly it would be the unavailability of the data in the company's annual report, especially the 
data on the number of dependent and independent director's information. Fourthly, it could also 
have utilized other performance ratios such as earnings per share and Q-ratio which is also 
related to calculate the profitability of a company where the earnings per share is related how 
much the investors earned for his investment. 
Lastly, this study disregards the external factors affecting the corporate performance. For 
example, the introduction of new laws and regulations, change in inflation rate and political 
change in a country may have substantial impact on company performance. In addition to the 5 
corporate governance variables used in this study, other variables for instance, gearing ratio and 
director's role duality could be added as control variables. 
62 
5.3 Recommendations for future study 
Currently, research has focused on the direct relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance. It is also to be recommended to investigate the indirect relationship through the 
corporate governance such as capital structure, compensation schemes, investment decisions, 
management successions and dividend policy. 
Advisable that future studies should take into the consideration on various types of independent 
variables such as EPS, Liquidity and Dividend per share whicli is more significant in defining the 
results towards the financial performance. 
Data used in this study were obtained from the annual reports, thus qualitative nature of the 
board of director ' s characteristics are not examined. Further investigation using panel data 
certainly should give better understanding about the effects of corporate governance towards 
company performance. Moreover, the study focused on ov~rall firms in Malaysia but not to 
particular industry; thus it would be interesting to know which industry perform in Malaysia. 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
From the findings, it can be concluded that in the presence of controlling variables SIZE and 
Leverage, the BOD, IBOD and CF are not able to significantly influence the variation in the 
performance of the companies. 
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LIST OF APPENDIX 
Sample of Top 100 Listed Companies: 
1. MALAY AN BANKING 
2. CIMB 
3. SIMEDARBYBERHAD 
4. PUBLIC BANK BERHAD 
5. MAXIS 
6. MISC BRHAD 
7. TENAGA NASIONAL BERHAD 
8. IOI CORPORATION BERHAD 
9. AXIATA GROUP BERHAD 
10. GENTING GROUP BERHAD 
11 . PETRONAS 
12. PPB BROUP BERHAD 
13. DIGI 
14. KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG BERHAD 
15. PLUS EXPRESSWAY BERHAD 
16. YTL POWER INTERNATIONAL BERHAD 
17. GENTING MALAYSIA BERHAD 
18. ARAB MALAYSIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK BERHAD 
19. YTL CEMENT BERHAD 
20. HONG LEONG BANK BEHAD 
21. RHB CAPITAL BEHAD 
22. BRITISH AMERICAN TOBBACO 
23. TELEKOM MALAYSIA BERHAD 
24. PETRONAS DAGANGAN 
25. ASTRO 
26. HONG LEONG FINANCIAL GROUP 
27. NESTLE 
28. MMC CORPORATION BERHAD 
29. UMW HOLDINGS BERHAD 
30. TANJONG PUBLIC LIMITED COMP ANY 
31. MALAYSIAN AIRLINES 
32. IJM CORPORATION BERHAD 
33 . BERJAYA CORPORATION BERHAD 
34. BERJA YA SPORT TOTO BERHAD 
35. GAMUDABERHAD 
36. LAFARGE MALAY AN CEMENT BERHAD 
37. MALAYSIA AIRPORT HOLDINGS BERHAD 
38. PARKSON HOLDINGS BERHAD 
39. BERJA YA LAND BERHAD 
40. UEM LAND HOLDINGS BERHAD 
41. GENTING PLANTATION BERHAD 
42. EON CAPITAL BERHAD 
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43 . BATU KAW AN BERHAD 
44. AFFIN HOLDINGS BERHAD 
45. ALLIANCE FINANCIAL GROUP BERHAD 
46. FRASER & NEAVE HOLDINGS BHD 
47. SP SETIAGROUP BERHAD 
48. TOP GLOVE CORPORATION BERHAD 
49. BURSA MALAYSIA 
50. BOUSTEAD HOLDINGS BERHAD 
51. AIR ASIA BERHAD 
52. SHELL MALAYSIA 
53. JCY 
54. ORIENTAL HOLDINGS BERHAD 
55. MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BERHAD 
56. UNITED PLANTATION BERHAD 
57. KLCC PROPERTY HOLDINGS BERHAD 
58. TAN CHONG MOTORS HOLDINGS BERHAD 
59. PROTON 
60. SAPURA CREST PETROLEUM 
61. BINTULU PORT HOLDINGS BERHAD 
62. IGB CORPORATION BERHAD 
63. STAR PUBLICATION MALAYSIA BERHAD 
64. UM LAND BERHAD 
65. KULIM MALAYSIA BERHAD 
66. KENCANA PETROLEUM 
67. GUINNESS ANCHOR BERHAD 
68 . MULTI-PURPOSE HOLDINGS BERHAD 
69. TITAN CHEMICALS CORPORATION BERHAD 
70. LPI CAPITAL BERHAD 
71. DIALOG GROUP BERHAD 
72. MUD AJAY A GROUP BERHAD 
73. MEDIA PRIMA BERHAD 
74. KNM GROUP BERHAD 
75 . MALAYSIAN RESOURCES CORPORATION BERHAD 
76. DRB-HICOM BERHAD 
77. WCT BERHAD 
78. UM PLANTATION BERHAD 
79. YTL CEMENT BERHAD 
80. HARTALEGA HOLDINGS BERHAD 
81. SUPERMAX CORPORATION BERHAD 
82. HAP SENG PLANTATIONS HOLDINGS BERHAD 
83. AEON 
84. HAP SENG CONSOLIDATED BERHAD 
85. SUNWA Y CITY BERHAD 
86. KFC HOLDINGS 
87. WAH SEONG CORPORATION BERHAD 
88. KPJ HEAL TH CARE BERHAD 
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89. LINGKARAN TRANS KOTA HOLDINGS BERHAD 
90. MASTERSKILL EDUCATION GROUP BERHAD 
91. NCB HOLDINGS BERHAD 
92. QL RESOURCES BERHAD 
93. CARLSBERG MALAYSIA 
94. UNISEM MALAYSIA BERHAD 
95. POS MALAYSIA 
96. JT INTERNATIONAL BERHAD 
97. MAH SING GROUP BERHAD 
98. MALAYSIAN PACIFIC INDUSTRIES BERHAD 
99. MEDIA CHINESE INTERNATIONAL BERHAD 
100. TAGB 
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LIST OF APPENDIX 
3.1 Theoretical Framework 
Independent Variables Dependent 
Variables 
CG Mechanisms 
[ Board of Directors l 
[ Independent BOD l Corporate Financial 
[ Firm size l Performance 
> I • ROA [ Leverage l • ROE 
[ Cash Flow l 
I 
Table 3.2 Sectorial Analysis of the sample 
Industry /Sector No of Companies 
Finance 11 





Consumer Product 10 






Table 3.3 Table of Variables 
Dependent Variables Acronyih 
I 
Return on Asset ROA 
Return on Equity ROE 
Independent Variables Acronyip 
Number of Directors BOD 
Number of Independent Board of Directors IBOD 
Firm Size SIZE 
Cash Flow CF 
Leverage LV I 
Table 3.4 Table of Key Concept 
VARIABLES MEASUREMENT 
Number of directors The total numbf r of directors on the board 
Number of Independent board of 'Number of 
directors (BOD) Independent Directors 
Total num. of directors 
Firm Size Natural log of total asset 
Cash flow Natural log of total cash and cash equivalent 




Table 4.1 Industry Classification 
Industry/Sector No of Compa]!lies 
Finance 11 
I 
Trading & Service 46 
Plantation 8 
Industrial Product 7 
Consumer Product 10 






Table 4.2 Summary of Descriptive Statistics for Return on Asset 
D . f St f f escrip· 1ve a IS ICS 
N Minimum Maximum Mean I Std . Deviation 
ROA 100 .0000 .4987 .08157d .0766588 
ROE 100 .0000 1.7588 .179871 .2458282 
BOD 100 4.0000 14.0000 9.345000 2.0467330 
1800 100 2.0000 7.5000 4.495000 1.2086494 
SIZE 100 19.0681 26.6921 22.418014' 1.6240073 
LV 100 .0232 .9380 .489487 .2338353 
CF 100 8.9619 24.2678 19.803178 2.2935354 
Valid N (listwise) 100 I 
I 
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Table 4.3 Correlation analysis of the independent variables 
BOD 1800 SIZE 
BOD Pearson Correlation 1 .594- .173 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .084 
1800 Pearson Correlation _594- 1 .273-
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .006 
SIZE Pearson Correlation .173 .273- 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .084 .006 
LV Pearson Correlation .125 _249· _553-
Sig. (2-tailed) .215 .012 .000 
CF Pearson Correlation .126 -.012 .55r 
Sig. (2-tailed) .213 .905 .000 
Table 4.4 Model Summary ROA 
Md IS o e ummary 
Adjusted R Std. Error of the 
Model R R Square Square Estimate 
1 .5038 .253 .214 .0679807 
Table 4.5 Results of regression coefficients for ROA 
Coefficientsa 
Standardized 
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .597 .094 



















-!i !i14 ()()() 
Table 4.6 Model Summary ROE 
Model Summary 
Adjusted R Std . Error of the 
Model R R Square Square Estimate 
1 .391a .153 .108 .2322325 
a. Predictors: (Constant) , CF, IBOD, LV, BOD, SIZE 
Table 4. 7 Results of regression coefficients for ROE 
Coefficients a 
Standardized 
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta I t Siq. 
1 (Constant) 1.342 .363 3.694 .000 
BOD -.016 .014 -.131 -1.089 .279 
IBOD -.011 .026 -.056 -.447 .656 
SIZE -.059 .021 -.392 -2.813 .006 
LV .403 .121 .383 3.318 .001 
CF .009 .013 .08o l .673 .503 
78 
Table 5.1 Summary of Findings 
Hypothesis Findings 
Hl: There is a significant relationship between corporatd financial 




H2: There is a significant relationship between corporatd financial Rejected 
performance and the independent boards of directors (BOD). I 
H3: There is a significant relationship between corporate finapcial Accepted 
performance and size. 
H4: There is a significant relationship between I financial Accepted corporate 
performance and leverage. 
I 
H5: There is a significant relationship between corporatt financial Rejected 
performance and cash flow. 
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